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List of Parties 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Rules of the Court of 
Appeals, plaintiff represents that the names of all parties to 
this appeal appear in the caption hereof. The plaintiffs are 
the owner and mortgagee, respectively, of the building in 
question. Since their interests are aligned, they will 
collectively be referred to as "plaintiff". 
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(i) 
Statement of Jurisdiction and Nature 
of the Proceedings Below 
The Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. This appeal was "poured 
over" to the Court Of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court by 
notice of November 3, 1988. 
In the proceedings below, the parties cross-moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of whether an "earth movement" 
exclusion in the subject insurance policy excluded plaintiff's 
property loss. The Lower Court found that that the exclusion 
did apply, as a matter of law, thus granting defendant's motion 
and denying plaintiff's motion. 
Statement of Issue Presented For Review 
The issue presented for review is an issue of law. 
The parties agreed on the relevant facts. The issue is 
whether, as a matter of law, the "earth movement" exclusion in 
the defendant's insurance policy applies to the property loss 
sustained by plaintiff. 
It is respectfully submitted that this is an issue of 
first impression in this jurisdiction. 
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
The issue of law presented herein is determined by 
case law, rather than statutory or constitutional law. 
Statement of the Case 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, plaintiff states the case as follows: 
(i) Nature of the Case - This is an insurance 
coverage case. This is a first-party action (i.e. insured 
against carrier) to determine whether there is coverage for 
plaintiff's loss. The loss at issue is a property loss, i.e. 
structural damage to plaintiff's building. 
(ii) Course of Proceedings - This action seeking 
determination of insurance coverage was filed in February 
1987. Defendant answered by claiming, inter alia, that its 
insurance policy had an "earth movement" clause which excluded 
coverage for plaintiffs loss. After discovery, the parties 
cross-moved for summary judgment on the issu€> of whether that 
"earth movement" exclusion applied to plaintiff's loss. 
(iii) Disposition in the Court Below - The Lower 
Court granted the defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, and 
denied plaintiff's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment. In other 
words, the Lower Court found that the "earth movement" 
exclusion did exclude coverage for plaintiff's loss, as a 
matter of law. This appeal followed. 
If the Lower Court's Judgment were to be reversed, 
defendant has a remaining defense to coverage that would 
necessitate trial. In this regard, plaintiff's Motion For 
Summary Judgment below properly should have been designated a 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. 
(iv) Statement of Relevant Facts - The relevant facts 
were not contested, and were set forth in defendant's 
Memorandum In Support Of Summary Judgment (R. 68) and 
plaintiff's Memorandum In Support Of Cross-Motion For Summary 
Judgment (R. 145) . A concise summary of the relevant facts 
follows: 
Plaintiff owns and operates the Village Inn Apartments 
in Cedar City, Utah (R. 147). In 1986, plaintiff was insured 
with defendant State Farm under an Apartment Policy (hereafter 
"the policy," R. 81, relevant sections in Addendum hereto). 
The policy generally provided plaintiff with property and 
liability coverage (R. 69). The loss here was a property loss. 
On or before February 24, 1986, an underground water 
pipe ruptured on the premises of plaintiff's Village Inn 
Apartments (R. 68). The escaping water saturated the soil 
beneath, causing the soil to lose its weight-bearing ability. 
The foundation settled almost 8 inches (R. 69). Estimated 
costs of repair: $70,000 (R. 147). 
After the loss, Plaintiff submitted a claim to its 
insurance carrier (defendant State Farm). Defendant 
investigated the claim, and ultimately denied same on the 
ground, inter alia, of an "earth movement" exclusion in the 
policy. After the claim was denied, plaintiff brought this 
action seeking a determination of coverage. 
Summary of Arguments 
Plaintiff argues that the Lower Court made an error of 
law when it determined that the earth movement clause excluded 
coverage for plaintiff's loss as a matter of law. Plaintiff 
argues that the earth movement clause is inapplicable to this 
loss, as a matter of law. There are three grounds for 
plaintiff's argument. 
First, the earth movement clause does not apply 
because no earth movement occurred here. In the policy, the 
undefined phrase "earth movement" is followed by a string of 
natural phenomenon and acts of God (e.g. earthquake, volcano, 
landslide). Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the phrase 
"earth movement" should be construed to mean natural forces 
such as those mentioned, not "man-made" losses such as a pipe 
break. 
Second, the phrase "earth movement" can be construed 
as ambiguous, because it is undefined and reasonably 
suspectible of different meanings. That ambiguity is strictly 
construed against the carrier and in favor of coverage. 
Third, to construe the earth movement exclusion as 
applicable to this foundation-settling loss renders the policy 
duplicative. 
Argument 
The defendant carrier has denied this claim on the 
basis of an earth movement exclusion in the policy. However, 
the policy does not define the phrase "earth movement". 
Therefore, the Court must construe that phrase. Plaintiff 
submits that the phrase could be construed in either of two 
ways: under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, or as ambiguous. 
Under either construction, the result is the same: the phrase 
"earth movement" is deemed to apply only to natural forces and 
natural phenomenon. The majority of jurisdictions to construe 
such exclusionary language have so ruled. 
Before addressing the proper construction of the 
phrase "earth movement", the burden of proof in the Lower Court 
and the standard of review on this appeal will be set forth. 
When an insurer denies a loss based upon an exclusion 
in its policy, the insurer has the burden of proving by the 
weight of the evidence that the loss falls within that cited 
exclusion. Whitlock v. Old American Insurance Company 442 P.2d 
26, 21 Utah 2d 131 (Utah 1968). The Lower Court determined 
summarily that the defendant carried its burden of proving that 
this loss fell within the earth movement exclusion. On appeal, 
this Court should not accord any particular deference to the 
Lower Court's decision on this legal issue. Since the Summary 
Judgment was granted as a matter of law rather than fact, this 
Court is free to reappraise the Trial Court's legal 
conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Insurance Exchange 751 P.2d 248 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
I. 
IF THE PHRASE "EARTH MOVEMENT" IS CONSTRUED 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS, THE 
EXCLUSION DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS LOSS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The defendant carrier relied upon the "earth movement" 
exclusion in the policy to deny coverage. That earth movement 
clause appears as 1f 3.b in the policy and excludes property 
"caused by, resulting from, contributed to, 
or aggravated by any of the following: (1) 
earth movement, whether combined with water, 
including but not limited to earthquake, 
volcanic eruption, landslide, subsidence, 
mudflow, sinkhole, erosion, or the sinking, 
arising, shifting, expanding or contracting 
of earth." (1f 3.b. of Policy, see p. 1) 
Because the phrase "earth movement" is undefined, the 
Court must construe the scope of that language. Other Courts 
faced with similar, undefined "earth movement" clauses have 
applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis to hold that the phrase 
only applies to natural or geologic phenomenon. 
_ £ _ 
In the exclusion, the phrase "earth movement" is an 
undefined general phrase grouped together with more specific 
terms. Where general language is used together with specific 
words, the familiar rule of construction known as ejusdem 
generis ("of the same kind") requires that the general words be 
restricted to a sense analogous to the specific words. Fields 
v. Mtn. States Tel, and Tel., 754 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1988), 
Matter of Disconnection of Certain Territory 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 
1983) . 
This rule of construction, ejusdem generis, mandates 
that the general term "earth movement" be restricted to the 
specific surrounding terms (such as earthquake, volcano, 
landslide, mudflow, rising and shifting of earth) which 
contemplate natural or geologic forces. Each of the recent 
cases cited hereafter is a first-party action for property 
coverage in which the Court, as a matter of law, construed the 
phrase "earth movement" to apply only to natural forces or 
natural phenomenon. 
In United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. 709 
P.2d 649 (N.M. 1985) an earthen dam failed. The carrier denied 
coverage on the grounds, inter alia, of the earth movement 
exclusion. The trial court construed the exclusion to apply to 
"other naturally occurring phenomenon" in addition to the 
"flood, earthquake, landslide [and] subsidence" cited in the 
exclusion. That construction was affirmed by the New Mexico 
Supreme Court: 
"In construing the term 'earth movement' to 
cover only naturally occurring phenomenon, 
the trial court applied the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis. Numerous other cases have 
applied the doctrine to the term 'earth 
movement' [citations omitted] . . . 
Therefore, we determine that the trial court 
did not err in applying the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis to the term 'earth movement' 
and thereby finding that the exclusion in 
the Allendale insurance policy did not apply 
to the tailings dam spill . . . " Id. at 
652-3. 
In Holy Angels Academy v. Hartford Ins. Co., 487 
NYS.2d 1005 (N.Y. 1985), a foundation settled due to nearby 
construction work. The carrier denied coverage on the basis of 
the earth movement exclusion. The parties cross-moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of coverage. The court granted 
summary judgment for the insured, applying the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis to construe the "earth movement" phrase as 
restricted to natural phenomenon: 
" . . .these words must be read in context 
with those that surround them (ejusdem 
generis) and, therefore, are limited in 
application to natural phenomena . . . " Id. 
at 1007. 
In Henning Nelson Const. Co. v. Firemen's Fund, 383 
N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1986) a foundation wall collapsed. The 
carrier denied coverage on the grounds, inter alia, of the 
earth movement exclusion. The lower court held the exclusion 
inapplicable, construing the exclusion as relating only to 
earth movement caused by widespread natural disaster. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed: 
"The phrase 'any other earth movement' must 
be construed within the context of the 
exclusion as a whole and cannot be 
artificially separated from the other 
language [citation omitted]. Taken in this 
manner, the earth movement exclusion must be 
construed to apply to earth movements caused 
by widespread natural disasters and not to 
those caused by human forces." Id. at 653. 
In Peters TP. School Dist. v. Hartford Indemnity Co. 
833 F.2d 32 (Third Cir. 1987), a school sank after a mine 
subsided. The carrier denied coverage under the earth movement 
exclusion. The District Court construed the earth movement 
clause to exclude property damage from natural causes such as 
earthquake, landslides, and mudflows. In upholding this 
construction, the Third Circuit Court traced the historical 
basis for construing earth movement exclusions to apply only to 
natural phenomenon: 
"We begin our review by noting that earth 
movement exclusions in an insurance policy 
generally refer to and have historically 
related to catastrophic and extraordinary 
calamity such as earthquakes and landslides 
. . . We conclude, as did the District Court 
. . . that the earth movement exclusion in 
the policy was meant to deny coverage for 
_Q__ 
spontaneous, natural, catastrophic earth 
movement, and not movements brought about by 
other causes." Id. at 35-6. 
The Third Circuit Court in Peters found, as a matter of law, 
that the carrier had failed to carry its burden of proving that 
the loss fell within the earth movement exclusion. Partial 
summary judgment was granted the insured on the earth movement 
exclusion. 
Thus, numerous jurisdictions have recently construed 
the language "earth movement" under the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis to apply only to losses by natural forces and natural 
phenomenon. Ejusdem generis is a familiar rule of construction 
in Utah as well, and "requires that the general words be 
restricted to a sense analogous to the specific words". Matter 
of Disconnection, supra, at 548. Therefore, the earth movement 
exclusion should be construed to apply only to natural forces, 
not "man-made" events such as a broken pipe. 
II. 
IF THE PHRASE "EARTH MOVEMENT" IS CONSTRUED 
AS AMBIGUOUS, THE EXCLUSION DOES NOT APPLY 
TO THIS LOSS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In construing the undefined "earth movement" language, 
there is an alternative to the doctrine of ejusdem generis. 
This Court could also construe the undefined phrase as 
ambiguous. 
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In Utah, exclusionary language in an insurance policy 
is ambiguous if the language can be reasonably understood by 
the insured in a different manner than the carrier. In Fuller 
v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985) the issue was 
whether a policy insuring an employer against "damages" covered 
liability for out-of-state worker's compensation. In finding 
coverage, the Court observed that: 
"At best, the meaning of the term as used in 
the employer's [insurance policy] is 
ambiguous. Plaintiff could have reasonably 
understood these provisions to cover his 
out-of-state worker's compensation liability 
. . . Therefore, facially, these provision 
afford coverage . . . " Id. at 1048. 
Thus, under Fuller the critical question is whether an 
insured could have reasonably understood the policy language in 
a certain way. If so, coverage exists, because "An insured is 
entitled to the broadest protection he could have reasonably 
understood to be provided by the policy." Fuller, supra, at 
1047. 
The rule of Fuller was recently applied by this Court 
in Metropolitan Property and Liability Ins. Co. v. Finlayson 
751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988). Metropolitan Property was a 
declaratory judgment action to determine whether an insurance 
policy exclusion applied to the insured's loss. Specifically, 
the carrier relied on a clause excluding coverage for 
"non-owned automobiles" available for "regular use". The lower 
court granted summary judgment to the carrier, finding that the 
clause excluded coverage for plaintiff's loss as a matter of 
law. On appeal, the insured argued that the undefined phrase 
"regular use" was ambiguous. This Court agreed: 
"As previously stated, if the words used to 
express the meaning and intention of the 
parties may be understood to reach two or 
more plausible meanings, the language is 
ambiguous. We find either construction 
presented by the parties plausible. Each 
interpretation has some support in the case 
law and in ordinary usage". Metropolitan 
Property, supra, at 258. 
Accordingly, the Metropolitan Property Court held that the 
ambiguous phrase must be construed in favor of coverage, and 
reversed the summary judgment of the lower court. 
Defendant herein construes the phrase "earth movement" 
to mean any physical displacement of soil. Plaintiff herein 
construes the phrase "earth movement" to mean movement caused 
by natural forces or acts of God. The issue is whether 
plaintiff's construction is plausible. That issue is to be 
decided by reference to "ordinary usage" and case law. 
Metropolitan Property, supra, at 258. 
With regard to "ordinary usage", a reasonable layman 
reading the language of this earth movement exclusion could 
plausibly understand the clause to exclude coverage for natural 
forces and acts of God. The phrase "earth movement" itself is 
immediately followed by phrases denoting natural forces and 
natural disasters. Furthermore, to determine ordinary usage 
this Court can look to Webster's Dictionary, as it did in 
Metropolitan Property, supra. According to Webster, the 
ordinary meaning of "earth movement" is a geologic or natural 
force: 
"Earth Movement - Geol. differential 
movement of the earth's crust; elevation or 
subsidence of the land, diastrophism; 
faulting; folding . . . " Webster's New 
Int'1 Dictionary, 2nd Ed. p. 809. 
In addition to ordinary usage, this Court can look to 
case law of sister jurisdictions in determining whether 
insurance policy language is ambiguous. See Metropolitan 
Property, supra, at 257-8; Fire Ins. Exchange v. Alsop 709 P.2d 
389 (Utah 1985). Sister jurisdictions have found the phrase 
"earth movement" ambiguous because laymen could plausibly 
conclude that it referred to natural forces and natural 
disasters. 
This precise issue was decided in 1985 by the Court in 
Holy Angels Academy, supra: 
"Upon review, this Court finds that it is 
not unreasonable for an ordinary individual 
reading the policy language: 
'Earth movement, including but not 
limited to earthquake, landslide, 
mudflow, earth sinking, earth rising or 
shifting' 
to conclude that this exclusion was designed 
and intended to remove from coverage, 
property damage occurring from such natural 
causes as earthquakes, landslides and 
mudflows . . . the policy holder is merely 
limiting the exclusionary clauses to those 
same general kind and class of perils as 
enumerated in companion language. In so 
holding we note, therefore, that [the 
carrier] has not established that its 
interpretation is the only one that can be 
fairly applied to the policy language, and, 
accordingly, we must resolve the ambiguity 
in favor of the insured." Id. at 1007 
In so holding, the Holy Angels Court noted that similar 
exclusionary language had been the subject of judicial 
interpretation in several jurisdictions, with only one Court 
finding the language unambiguous. 
Thus, ordinary usage and case law from sister 
jurisdictions demonstrate that a layman could plausibly 
understand the language "earth movement" to refer to natural 
and geologic forces. The defendant insurance company has a 
different understanding of the language. This renders the term 
ambiguous, and that ambiguity is resolved against the carrier 
and in favor of coverage. Metropolitan Property, supra, at 
258; Fuller, supra, at 1046. 
III. 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE PHRASE "EARTH MOVEMENT" 
RENDERS THE POLICY DUPLICATIVE. 
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Defendant urges that the phrase "earth movement" 
should be construed to apply to a foundation-settling loss such 
as occurred here. However, defendant's policy has an entirely 
separate exclusion for foundation-settling. See Exclusion I.e. 
of the policy (Addendum, p. 2). If State Farm believed the 
earth movement exclusion applied to foundation-settling losses, 
it was superfluous to provide a separate exclusion for 
foundation-settling. 
A similar situation arose in Jones v. Saint Paul Ins. 
Co., 725 S.W.2d 291 (Texas App. 1987). In Jones, a foundation 
settled as earth dried, causing a wall to collapse. The 
carrier denied coverage on the basis of the earth movement 
exclusion and a foundation-settling exclusion. The Jones Court 
held the earth movement exclusion inapplicable as a matter of 
law, for two reasons. First, earth movement "contemplated 
abnormally large movements such as the examples listed." 
Second, it would be incongruous to construe the earth movement 
exclusion to cover foundation-settling when the policy had a 
separate exclusion for foundation-settling: 
"A contract must be construed to give effect 
to all its provisions, if possible, and a 
construction will not be placed on one 
provision if it causes another to be 
meaningless [citations omitted]. Another 
exclusion pled by [the carrier] was 
settling, cracking, or other defect of 
foundations. This 'settling' exclusion 
_ 1 c;_ 
would be rendered meaningless by adopting 
the construction of 'earth movement' urged 
by [the carrier]." Id. at 297 
Conclusion 
Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the Lower Court 
and hold that the policy's earth movement exclusion does not 
apply t 0 plaintiff's loss, as a matter of law. The result is 
the same whether the undefined phrase "earth movement" is 
construed under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, or as 
ambiguous. 
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ADDENDUM 
Two Relevant Sections Of 
State Farm Policy 
SECTION I 
LOSSES INSURED AND 
LOSSES NOT INSURED (cont.) 
ance of property, or shortage of property 
disclosed on taking inventory; 
i. due to any delay or loss of market ; 
j . caused by repeated leakage or seepage of 
water or s team whether cont inuous or inter-
mi t ten t f rom any: 
(1) heat ing, air condi t ion ing or refr igerating 
sys tem; 
(2) domest ic appliance; or 
(3) p lumbing sys tem, including f rom or 
around any shower stall or other show-
er bath instal lat ion, bath tub or other 
p lumbing f ixture. 
2 . The Company does not insure for loss either con-
sist ing of, or directly and immediate ly caused by 
power , heating or cooling fai lure, or due to change 
in temperature or humid i ty , unless the failure or 
change results f rom physical damage to the bui ld-
ing or to equipment contained therein caused by a 
Loss Insured. Also, the Company shall not be liable 
under this exclusion for any loss result ing f rom 
r iot , r iot at tending a str ike, civil commot i on , or 
vandal ism or malicious mischief. 
3. The Company does not insure for loss wh ich 
wou ld not have occurred in the absence of one or 
more of the fo l lowing excluded events. The Com-
pany does not insure for such loss regardless 
of: a) the cause of the excluded event ; or b) other 
causes of the loss; or c) whether other causes 
acted concurrent ly or in any sequence w i th the 
excluded event to produce the loss: 
a. occasioned directly or indirectly by enforce-
ment of any ordinance or law regulat ing the 
const ruct ion, repair or demol i t ion of bui ld-
ings or structures; 
b. caused by, result ing f r o m , cont r ibuted to , or 
aggravated by any of the fo l low ing : 
(1) earth movement , whether combined 
w i th water or not , including but not 
l imi ted to earthquake, volcanic erup-
t ion , landslide, subsidence, mud f low , 
sinkhole, erosion, or the s inking, r is ing, 
sh i f t ing, expanding, or contract ing of 
ADDENDUM p . 1 
(2) f l ood , surface water , waves, tidal wa-
ter or t idal waves, over f low of streams 
or other bodies of water , or spray f rom 
any of the foregoing, all whether driven 
by w ind or not ; 
(3) water wh ich backs up through sewers 
or drains; 
(4) water below the surface of the ground 
including that wh ich exerts pressure on 
or f lows , seeps or leaks through side-
wa lks , dr iveways, foundat ions, wal ls, 
basement or other f loors, or through 
doors, w i n d o w s or any other opening 
in such sidewalks, dr iveways, founda-
t ions, walls or f loors; 
unless fire or explosion as insured against 
ensues, and then the Company shall be liable 
only for loss caused by the ensuing fire or 
explosion. This exclusion shall not apply to 
loss arising f rom thef t ; 
c. hosti le or warl ike action in t ime of peace or 
war, including action in hindering, combat ing 
or defending against an actual, impending or 
expected attack: 
(1) by any government or sovereign power 
(de jure or de facto), or by any authori ty 
maintain ing or using mil i tary, naval or 
air forces; 
(2) by mil i tary, naval or air forces; or 
(3) by an agent of any such government , 
power , authori ty or forces; 
it being understood that any discharge, ex-
plosion or use of any weapon of war employ-
ing nuclear fission or fusion shall be conclu-
sively presumed to be such a hosti le or 
warl ike act ion by such a government , power , 
author i ty or forces; 
d. insurrect ion, rebell ion, revolut ion, civil war , 
usurped power , or action taken by govern-
mental author i ty in hindering, combat ing or 
defending against such an occurrence, 
seizure or destruct ion under quarantine or 
cus tom 's regulat ions, conf iscat ion by order 
of any government or public author i ty, or 
risks of cont raband nr ilipnal r r a n c n o r t ^ i ^ n 
SECTION! 
LOSSES INSURED AND 
LOSSES NOT INSURED 
ADDENDUM p . 2 
LOSSES 
INSURED 
This policy insures for accidental direct physical loss 
except as provided in SECTION I - LOSSES NOT IN-
SURED. 
LOSSES NOT 
INSURED 
1. The Company does not insure for loss either con-
sisting of, or directly and immediately caused by, 
one or more of the following: 
a. caused by leakage or overflow from plumb-
ing, heating, air conditioning or other equip-
ment or appliances (except fire protective 
systems) caused by freezing while the de-
scribed building is vacant or unoccupied, un-
less the insured shall have exercised due dili-
gence with respect to maintaining heat in the 
buildings or unless such equipment and ap-
pliances have been drained and the water 
supply shut off during such vacancy or unoc-
cupancy; 
b. caused by any electrical injury or disturbance 
of electrical appliances, devices, fixtures, or 
wiring caused by electrical currents artificially 
generated unless fire as insured against en-
sues. The Company shall be liable only for 
loss caused by the ensuing fire. 
c. caused by pilferage, appropriation or 
concealment of any property covered or any 
fraudulent, dishonest or criminal act done by 
or at the instigation of any insured, partner or 
joint venturer, including any officer, director, 
trustee, employee or agent thereof, or any 
person to whom the property covered may 
be entrusted; 
d. caused by: 
(1) wear and tear, marring or scratching; 
(2) deterioration, inherent vice, latent de-
fect; 
(3) mechanical breakdown of machines, 
including rupture or bursting caused by 
centrifugal force; 
(4) rust, mold, wet or dry rot, contamina-
tion; 
(5) dampness or dryness of atmosphere, 
changes in or extremes of temperature; 
(6) smog, smoke from agricultural smudg-
ing or industrial operations; 
(7) birds, vermin, rodents, insects or ani-
mals; 
unless loss by fire, smoke (other than smoke 
from agricultural smudging or industrial oper-
ations) explosion, collapse of a building, 
glass breakage or water not otherwise ex-
cluded ensues. This poiicy shall cover only 
such ensuing loss. 
If loss by water not otherwise excluded en-
sues, this policy shall also cover the cost of 
tearing out and replacing of any part of the 
building covered required to effect repairs to 
the plumbing, heating or air conditioning sys-
tem or domestic appliance but excluding loss 
to the svstem or appliance from which the 
water escapes, 
due tc any and all settling shrinking, crack-
ing, bulging or expansion of driveways, side-
walks swimming pools, pavements, founda-
tions, walls, floors, roofs or ceilings, 
caused by explosion of steam boilers, steam 
pipes, steam turbines or steam engines (ex-
cept direct loss resulting from the explosion 
of accumulated gases or unconsumed fuel 
within the firebox, or combustion chamber of 
any fired vessel or within the flues or passag-
es which conduct the gases of combustion 
therefrom) if owned by, leased by or operat-
ed under the control of the insured, or for any 
ensuing loss except by fire or explosion not 
otherwise excluded. The Company shall be 
liable only for such ensuing loss; 
due to voluntary parting with title or posses-
sion of any property by the insured or others 
if inauced to ao so Dy any fraudulent scheme 
or false pretense, 
due [o unexplained or mysterious disappear-
